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DOES BAD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LEAD TO ... - Olin.wustl
theory: poor corporate governance and low investor protection may in fact lead .  Green, R.C., 1984, Investment incentives, debt and warrants, Journal of Fi- .
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Optimal securities under adverse selection and moral hazard ...
549582. Green, 1984 R. Green, Investment incentives, debt, and warrants, Journal of Financial Economics 13 (1984), pp. 115136. Hellwig, 1987 M. Hellwig, .
corporation has an incentive to fully insure property risks and to do so by levering . A number of . Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants. Journal of .
The issuance of convertible bonds and earnings management ...
If firms have valuable investment opportunities, they will raise funds from many . Green, R.C. (1984), "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants", Journal of .
Convertible Securities and Optimal Exit Decisions in Venture Capital ...
debt induces the correct incentives for entrepreneur to invest in projects with . we analyze the consequences of using convertible debt and equity to warrant an .
CREATING VALUE THROUGH MANAGING CORPORATE RISK
The shareholders have the option to default on the debt when the firm value falls . Green, Richard C., (1984), "Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants", .
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Deposit Insurance, Bank Incentives, and the Design of ... - SSRN
Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants," Journal of. Financial Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 115-136, March. 12 James, Christopher 1991 . The Losses Realized in .
Does Security Choice Matter in Venture Capital? The ... - Olin.wustl
May 20, 2012 . Let an external debt financing have at least one investor who does . alyzes the use of warrants and conversion features to aligns incentives of .
Green, R., 1984, Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants,' Journal of Financial Economics 13,. 115-136. Hansen, R. and C. Crutchley, 1990, Corporate .
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DEAL STRUCTURING OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN ...
Journal of Business Venturing 4(4): 231248. 11. Green, R. C. (1984) Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 13. pp.
Debt financing of high-growth startups: The venture debt business ...
venture capital dollars invested. . In addition, even though venture debt usually comes with warrants, lenders . Investment incentives, debt, and warrants.
The Economics of Covenants as a Means of - Economic Theory ...
lender that are induced by the allocation of cash flow rights in a debt contract. . 5 See, e.g., R. Green, 'Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants', 13 Journal of .
BPHD8230 - The Belk College of Business - University of North ...
Green, R., Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants, Journal of Financial. Economics, March 1984, 115-136. 5. Adverse Selection and Signaling/ Information .
Bibliography - World Scientific
Product Market Competition. International Journal of Industrial Organiza- tion 8(2 ): 271280. Green, R. C. (1984). Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants.
Stage financing and the role of convertible debt
An appropriately designed convertible debt contract succeeds .
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Security Design of Callable Convertible Bonds - World Finance ...
bonds are designed in response to costly debt- and equity-related financing . potential overinvestment incentive and minimize costs associated with . No subscription warrant, option or right should be attached to the CCB being offered (17 .
The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field
. and a good credit rating when issuing debt, and earnings per .
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Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance
. and the venture capitalist to invest efficiently into the project.
Contracting about Future Ownership Choices: IPOs ... - Yale University
Green, R., 1984, Investment incentives, debt and warrants Journal of Finan- cial Economics 13, 115-136. 22. Hart. O. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, .
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Options, Option Repricing and Severance Packages in ... - CiteSeer
that a call-type contract creates incentives to distort the choice of investment risk. . sion features and warrants can be used to control debt-induced agency .
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